Nuclear Power Stations: What We Don’t Want to Know About Strategic Strategic Forces? The Case for Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Washington. For all his threats to fire tactical nuclear arms at Ukrainian targets, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia is now discovering what the United States itself concluded years ago, American officials suspect: Small nuclear weapons are hard to use, harder to control and a far better weapon of terror and intimidation than a weapon of war.

NATO must be clear that it will take out the tactical nuclear weapons of Russia, if they moved out of their current location in order to threatenUkraine, and that they will retaliate with equal and greater force against any attacks on nuclear power stations.

So, how worried should we be? Here, former British army officer and former commander of the UK & NATO Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Forces, Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, explains the crucial differences between “tactical” and “strategic” weapons and why all-out nuclear war probably isn’t on the cards anytime soon.

These warheads are fitted to Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) which can travel thousands of miles and are aimed at key sites and cities in the US, UK, France and Russia.

Tactical nuclear weapons meanwhile are much smaller warheads with a yield, or explosive power, of up to 100 kilotons of dynamite – rather than roughly 1,000 kilotons for strategic warheads.

Bombing these power stations would not cause a nuclear explosion like a weapon detonation, but they could cause radioactive debris and damage local water supplies.

The fate of the strategic nuclear weapons in Europe – is there a chance to provoke a global nuclear war? Comment on De Bretton-Gordon

It is difficult to tell because of the condition of the strategic weapons, but my assumption is that they are in good repair and ready to go. It is only Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons which now give it parity with the US and NATO militarily, so I expect them to be well looked after.

But this is likely not the case for the tactical weapons. The missiles and warheads are not in good condition, but the vehicles they are mounted on are. Judging by the state of the rest of the Russian Army equipment on show in Ukraine, this is a fair assumption.

It’s likely that these weapons have a limited range of up to 500 kilometers, so they’ll have to travel hundreds of miles to get into a position where they can attack Ukraine. It is not likely that they will get that far from a mechanical perspective.

Also, it is likely these weapons rely on microprocessors and other high-tech components which are in very short supply in Russia – given international sanctions and the heavy use of precision guide missiles by Russia, which also use these parts.

At the heart of this move is attacking civilians rather than opposition forces. This manifests itself with attacks on hospitals, schools and ‘hazardous’ infrastructure, like chemical plants and nuclear power stations. If attacked they can become chemical or nuclear weapons.

The Russians hope that if the Ukrainian people give up, the military will quickly follow, which, in my opinion, is a highly flawed assumption – both are showing a lot more mettle than the Russians.

The current conditions show that all this will make its way west across Europe. If this attack were to happen, it would be seen as an attack on NATO and would give NATO the ability to strike back at Russia.

De Bretton-Gordon: The use of strategic nuclear weapons is extremely unlikely in my opinion. This is a war nobody can win, and at the moment it does not seem likely that this regional conflict in Europe would lead to a global nuclear war which could destroy the planet for many generations.

The checks and balances in the Kremlin are in place, as are the White House and 10 Downing Street to make certain we don’t get into a nuclear conflict on a whim.

Analysts within and outside of the government have doubts that using arms delivered in an artillery shell or thrown in the back of a truck will advance Mr. Putin’s objectives.

De Bretton-Gordon: I believe the Russians developed their unconventional warfare tactics in Syria. Russian forces entered Syria in 2015, supporting the Assad regime. Assad would not remain in power if he had not used chemical weapons.

On August 21 of last year, the rebels overran Damascus after being saved by the nerve agent attack. The four-year conventional siege of Aleppo was ended by multiple chlorine attacks.

It does not appear that Putin has any morals at all. Russia attacked hospitals and schools in Syria which it is repeating again in Ukraine. Unconventional warfare aims to break the will of civilians to resist, and Putin appears to be happy to use any means and weapons to achieve this.

Russian commanders are able to use tactical nuclear weapons to stave off the loss of Russian territory because of the Soviet doctrine.

The attempted annexation of four districts through the current sham referendums makes the likelihood of tactical use very high, if these places are attacked. Though one still expects that local commanders would defer to Putin first before pressing their own equivalent of a red button.

Western military sources say that Putin is involved in the battle and giving low-level commanders orders. This is extraordinary – it appears that only now Putin has lost faith in his generals after Ukraine recaptured large swathes of the north-east earlier this year – and suggests a broken command and control system, and a president who doesn’t trust his generals.

Even in an attack on a power station one assumes Putin would be involved, as the West would likely construe it as an improvised nuclear weapon and act accordingly.

Many U.S. officials say that the primary utility would be a last-ditch effort by Mr. Putin to stop the Ukrainian counteroffensive. The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe some of the most sensitive discussions inside the administration.

The Cold War Between the U.S. and the Soviets: a Cold War in the 1980’s and the Rise of the Cold War

Zelizer is a professor of history and public affairs at the Ivy League school. He is an author and editor of several books, including The Presidency of Donald J. Trump. Follow him on Twitter @julianzelizer. The views expressed in this commentary are his own. CNN has more opinion on it.

President joe Biden warned at a fund raiser for Senate democrats that the risk of an “Armageddon” is not this high since 1962.

US officials told CNN the warning is not based on any new intelligence but that it is troubling to hear from the commander in chief. The threat of nuclear weapons is something that all Americans can see, regardless of their political beliefs.

Biden’s comments referred to the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, when the world seemed to teeter on the brink of nuclear war as the US and the Soviet Union faced off over missiles in Cuba.

As President John F. Kennedy struggled through negotiations with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev for 13 days, Americans waited with bated breath and did their best to prepare for a nuclear attack. Some planned escape routes from major cities, others had radiation kits for their families. The leaders didn’t have control of the situation at the time, which made the danger even greater. In the end, diplomacy won out, a deal was reached and disaster was averted.

Reagan bucked conservative opposition to sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Agreement (INF) in 1987 even after railing against any negotiation with the Soviets. The emergence of Soviet Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev’s embrace of peace and reform led to the elimination of entire classes of missiles.

Soviet aggression was not able to make things easier. After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, Carter admitted, “My opinion of the Russians has changed most dramatically in the last week than even the previous two and one – half years before that.” Carter had already signed the SALT II treaty in June 1979 after seven years of negotiations, but he asked the Senate to postpone action on it after the Soviet invasion. (While the treaty was never ratified by Congress, the US voluntarily observed the arms limits for several years.)

During the 1980’s, a huge, international nuclear freeze movement took place, and created renewed pressure on elected officials to engage in negotiations again.

In 1991, after the Soviet Union collapsed, President Bush and Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treat (START) I which made deep cuts in each nation’s nuclear arsenal.

But when Donald Trump became president, he pulled out of the nuclear agreement with Iran in 2018 (subsequently, Iran has escalated its nuclear arms program). In 2019, the United States also withdrew from the INF Treaty. One year later, Trump took the same action with the Open Skies Treaty which helped reduce the risk of war and foster transparency.

With Putin threatening to use nuclear weapons, it’s past time to kick start a new era of arm controls. As Gorbachev said upon signing the INF treaty, “The treaty whose text is on this table offers a big chance at last to get onto the road leading away from the threat of catastrophe. It is our duty to use that chance to move towards a nuclear-free world, so that our children and grandchildren will not have to live in fear of a nuclear holocaust and that there will be no need for us to use our own weapons.

As the world now faces the real possibility of those weapons being deployed, let’s remember Gorbachev’s wise words — a sentiment that was shared by Reagan – and make this world safer.

“The resumption of shelling, hitting the plant’s sole source of external power, is tremendously irresponsible. Grossi said that the Nuclear Power Plant needs to be protected.

The resumed shelling is “tremendously irresponsible,” International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi said Saturday in a press release.

The Chernobyl Nuclear Exclusion Zone – First Battle of a Nuclear Power Plant in the First War of War: ZNPP Repairing The Power Line

“Although the six reactors are in cold shutdown, they still require electricity for vital nuclear safety and security functions. Each generator has sufficient fuel for at least ten days. According to the release, engineers from ZNPP have begun repairing the damaged power line.

This year marked the first time in which civilian nuclear-power facilities have come under attack during war. As Russian armed forces pushed into Ukraine in February, troops took control of the Chernobyl nuclear exclusion zone, where hundreds of people still manage the aftermath of the catastrophic 1986 meltdown. Thousands of vehicles stirred up radioactive dust when they moved towards Kyiv. Russian soldiers were working and sleeping near the abandoned city of Pripyat.

What Russian officials say: The plant can be put back into operation, said Vladimir Rogov, who is a senior pro-Russian official in the regional Zaporizhzhia government.

The risks of nuclear power production: Russia’s actions in Ukraine and the prospects for a sustainable future for nuclear power development in the next century

New questions must be asked by researchers and policymakers. Are other locations at risk, given the projected global growth in nuclear energy? How do Russia’s actions in Ukraine challenge the world’s commitment to the ‘peaceful uses’ of nuclear energy and to international mechanisms for countering nuclear-weapons proliferation? Can current treaties be adapted, or is a more robust legal architecture and rapid-response capability required? How can political obstacles be overcome?

The integrity of reactor cores and storage pools is the main concern. There is a good chance that fuel rods will be exposed and that a core melt and radiation release will take place. “And so, one mine or one missile or whatever”, warned Ukraine’s energy minister Herman Halushchenko, “could stop the working of the generators and then you have one hour and probably 30 minutes, not more than 2 hours, before the reaction starts.”

Outside of Europe, a majority of the units that are going to supply 60 gigawatts of new nuclear power are under construction. Nuclear power generation in China will be double to 180 gigawatts by the year 2035 at a cost of US$450 billion. India operates 22 reactors and is constructing 7 new ones; Bangladesh, Belarus, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates are each building their first.

Turkey’s borders with Iraq and Syria have been highly unstable, complicated further by persistent conflict with its Kurdish minority and the extremist Islamist movement Daesh. Relations between India and Pakistan have been more stable since the 1999 ‘Kargil war’, but border fighting regularly breaks out. India–China relations are also tense, but a Ukraine scenario seems unlikely. The most immediately concerning situation would be the deployment of troops from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan, which has three civilian nuclear reactors.

In addition, risk assessments should consider interactions between nuclear builds, risks of conflict, specific site vulnerabilities, and potential loss of life and land from radiation release. Some studies need to be classified and scholars need access to the information shared internationally. Significant industry and government investment is necessary for the task to be accomplished. It would spur and guide regulators and governments to action.

The five-yearly review conference ended in a stand-off after being fractured by division. Russia blocked the adoption of a draft outcome document that would have strengthened the treaty by considering, for the first time, the safety and security of nuclear-power plants in armed conflict zones, including Ukraine.

The get-out clause is in the protocol. It permits strikes on “other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations only if they are used in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support”.

Demilitarization of the site, subject to a UN Security Council resolution, would be uncontroversial. But how could such a situation be monitored and secured? There is one option that will give the IAEA a small neutral force to support. However, if attacks on the plant continue, they might be faced with the need to suppress troop incursions or rocket or artillery strikes on the site. This would require rapid access to air power and entail significant risks.

Without prior consent, a resolution would be impossible because of Russia’s veto. A resolution should be pursued. Negotiations over pullouts andpeacekeeping forces run in tandem. A well-designed deployment can put moral and strategic pressure on combatants to comply.

Russia annexing the Zaporizhia region and the control of the plant by the Rosatom add up to a lot of problems. Russia needs to recall the pragmatic spirit of the cold war, when, despite their bitter conflict, the superpowers cooperated to reduce the risks of nuclear war and proliferation in the global security interest. It is happening again today.

Scholars, non-governmental organizations, the civilian nuclear industry, and the IAEA also need to devote more resources to research into making nuclear plants safer5.

The report’s recommended changes to fuel-pool designs were minimal, and it admitted that risks were site- and design-specific. The 2020 Safety Guide is an important start for setting up new standards for operators. Yet the IAEA does not consider military attack as a specific risk influencing required design parameters8.

If the war ends without calamity at Zaporizhzhia, Russia, Ukranian and much of eastern Europe will be lucky. The world should be ashamed that, nearly 70 years after US President Dwight D. Eisenhower proclaimed the era of ‘atoms for peace’, people are depending on luck. The governments have the power to prevent disasters. Will they act?